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The Context of Innovation 
Of all human activity, surely one of the most problematic is 
forecasting future events. This is doubly so when there is no 
history upon which to base predictions. Forecasting the impacts 
of a new technology usually falls into this latter category. As 
an example of how wrong forecasts of technology can be, IBM 
estimated the total market for large computers at about 50, when 
the 650 computer was introduced, in the early 1950s. The 
currently installed user base of large systems in the US is 
approximately 100,000 as of 1983 (not even considering a three 
order of magnitude increase in the meaning of 'large'). 
The difficulty in predicting the impact of a new technology 
lies not in the mathematics of forecasting, which is highly 
developed, but in the assumptions used by forecasters, the 
inability to identify factors that may deflect, or enhance a 
technology, and in estimating accurately the behavior of direct 
and indirect consumers. There is a tendency also, when a new 
technology arrives, to confuse possible with likely outcomes. 
The forecaster traces the locus of all possibilities for the 
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technology, which then becomes its predicted trajectory. 1 
The reasons for these shortcomings are straightforward. We 
are human and by nature, optimists. Because a technology has the 
potential to be used in a particular way we then make the 
assumption it will be used that way. We are not sensitive to 
complexities in the technology or its application. We do not 
anticipate difficulties in adaptation. And, we are reluctant to 
acknowledge individual differences among consumers, presuming 
that others are just like ourselves. 
The literature on the diffusion of technology, often 
referred to as the innovation literature, suggests a variety of 
factors that influence adaptation. The most obvious are the 
characteristics of the technology itself, including the advantage 
that it has over previous methods, its affordability, its 
comprehensibility, the extent to which its adaptation can be 
staged, the extent to which the technology can be tested on a 
limited basis, the reversability of the commitment to the 
technology, the credibility of its advocates and the extent to 
which the technology is compatible with generally accepted 
'A case in point are the writings of the "cybernetic" school, 
in the late 1950s and early 60s, that predicted the imminent 
arrival of 1) machine intelligence, and 2) completely automated 
factories with the wholesale replacement of workers at all 
occupational levels [Wiener 61, Hodges 831. In spite of the 
current attention being given to Expert Systems, most of the 
difficult problems in Artificial Intelligence (AI), for example, 
common sense understanding and machine learning, remain to be 
solved and we are many years away from integrated manufacturing 
systems [OTA 841. 
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practices, norms and values [Rogers 62, Havelock 73, Bikson 811. 
While the details of the technology certainly play an important 
role in explaining innovation, they do not capture all of the 
factors needed to account for outcomes, especially those factors 
that describe the organizational context in which decisions about 
technology are made. 
Organizational factors that influence the adoption of 
technology consist of the environment in which a firm is 
embedded, that is, the structure of its industry, community 
setting and general economic conditions; the position of the firm 
in the industry including rank, firm size, composition of staff, 
and the acceptance of innovative behavior in the industry; firm 
characteristics composed of structure, degree of centralization 
of decision making and extent of formalization; and task design 
involving degree of specialization, organization of work, 
autonomy, and work load of individuals [Bikson 811, 
Both of these perspective presume a passive role is played 
by adopters, all of whom are supposed to have the same action 
rationale. In contrast, social interaction models of diffusion 
emphasize the importance of the implementation process per se, 
those situational factors surrounding the introduction and use of 
the technology in a particular setting. These factors might 
include the reasons for adoption; key actors who champion or 
guide the innovation, as well as those who resist it; the support 
of top management; involvement of users; training; alignment of 
incentives and counter incentives to change; and flexible and 
adaptive goal directed planning [Bikson 81, Keen 81, Turner 851. 
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Given all of the factors that may influence adaptation, it 
is evident why forecasting the impacts of a technology is so 
difficult. Any analysis that purports to predict impacts and 
consequences of a technology, and to explain causes, must 
consider most of these factors. While new ones may be added, not 
addressing those that have been shown to be important by other 
researchers is a major deficiency of any study. 
Threats Posed by Computer Technology 
In his paper, Democracy in an Information Society, Ted 
Sterling does the reader a service by identifying potential 
threats posed by computer and information technology in a free 
society. These threats include reduced participation in the 
process of governance; distortions in the electoral process, 
particularly in the composition of political parties; reduced 
stability in democratic structures; the role of a free market; 
the elements of contradiction in capitalism that could lead to a 
decrease of individual freedom and democratic rights, especially 
technological advances creating "a large pool of impoverished 
unemployables who might destabilize society." This is a big meal 
to consume in one seating! 
As best I can make out, the line of argument of the paper 
goes something like this: 
Sterling is concerned about the possibility of computer 
management systems, belonging to large institutions, such 
as, government agencies, the banking system, multi- 
national corporations, etc., influencing our economic, 
social and political systems and that these influences 
may be "anti-human." Large organizations will use their 
computer systems "to manage and to even act as 
substitutes for parts of their bureaucracies" and to 
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"integrate" their activities. He then argues that 
"computerized packages appear to give rise to social 
organizations and social functions that are usually 
associated with anti-democratic developments," that they 
"appear to promote centralization," that they "appear to 
limit participation," and that they "make it easier and 
cheaper to monitor citizens." He observes that it not 
need be this way, that computerized packages could "just 
as easily decentralize organized life, increase 
participation, and help protect individual privacy." 
Sterling attributes "the emerging shape of our society in 
the world of computers" not to "a conspiracy of powerful 
businessmen and government officials" who "seek to insure 
a central position for themselves", but to "the 
consistent pursuit of self-interest by upper-level 
management" because they make "the final decisions about 
which technology their organizations will absorb and how 
that technology will be bent to their purposes." 
(liberally adapted from pages 45-46) 
TWO questions appear fundamental in evaluating Sterling's 
position: 
* Is the contention that computing promotes anti- 
democratic activities, leads to centralization, limits 
participation and makes it easier to monitor citizens 
supported by evidence? 
* Are the reasons he provides for these outcomes 
plausible? 
Our approach will be to investigate one of the issues raised in 
detail. 
Centralized Control 
Sterling's argument that computing leads to increased 
centralized control in organizations rests on the "economies of 
designing, writing, implementing and maintaining large scale 
programming packages." He points out that "large programming 
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systems are very much easier and cheaper to design and install 
for centralized than for decentralized organizations since, in 
the latter, systems have to be programmed for communications 
within different levels of the pyramid." He continues, "from the 
design point of view, it is much simpler for an input or output 
terminal to communicate with a central programming stream and 
with a central programming stream to communicate with a terminal 
than it is for one terminal to communicate with another 
terminal." He then concludes that because of this the 
hierarchical structure of large organizations will be reinforced 
and, consequently, that computing will promote centralization. 
There are a number of difficulties with this line of 
reasoning. First, Sterling confuses a centralized application 
system (as contrasted with a distributed application system) with 
the centralization of control in an organization. The factors 
that govern whether an application is designed as centralized or 
not include the structure of the company's processing centers, 
the availability of a distribution network, the experience of key 
actors and technical staff, economics, and the benefits of 
providing data entry, storage and/or data access from remote 
locations, and the like. There are also many possible 
combinations of equipment configuration, processing location, 
data location and access, along a continuum from centralized to 
distributed, so that it is never clear whether any large 
application system is centralized or distributed. 2 
2 ~ o w  should one classify an airlines reservation system with 
several regional processing centers, one major data base and 
terminals on every sales agent's desk? 
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Centralization of control refers usually to the level at 
which certain classes of decisions are delegated. There are no 
research results which show highly centralized organizations, 
where most key decisions are vested in top management, have 
application systems that are more centralized than those in which 
key decisions are decentralized. Neither has there been any 
research that demonstrates centralized application systems 
increase the centralization of control in an organization, 
although some authors have argued that computer application 
systems, independent of whether they are centralized or 
distributed, may increase the potential for monitoring of 
employees [Zuboff 821. In fact, if the research results indicate 
anything it is that employees perceive computer application 
systems increasing their decision latitude, which would be 
considered as contributing to decentralization of control [Turner 
84a, Turner 851. 
What has been also shown in the research is that when there 
is a match between the organizational structure of a company and 
the structure of its computing services (that is, data or 
information processing) department, better performance 
results [Olson 801. 
Second, there are some specific technical inaccuracies with 
Sterling's argument. It is not at all clear that a large 
programming system is either easier or cheaper to design for a 
centralized organization, if centralized is taken to mean 
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'centralization of control. l 3  The level at which decisions are 
made in an organization probably has little to do with the cost 
or degree of difficulty in designing a system. As long as the 
organizations were the same approximate size, the systems would 
probably be comparable in complexity. If, however, Sterling's 
contrast is between an application system with a batch processing 
organization and one with an on-line organization, a case could 
probably then be made that the on-line system was more 
complex [Turner 811, but this would not contribute to the 
centralization argument. 
Many operating systems provide a capability that permits 
terminals using the same system to "talk" to each other (for 
example, the TALK, ADVISE and SEND commands in DEC's TOPS20) and 
some also provide the ability to tie computers of the same family 
together in a "network" that allows the exchange of messages and 
data between machines, and hence, terminals (for example, DEC'S 
DECNET). Other operating systems provide access methods for 
handling terminal messages (for example, IBM's TCAM and CICS) 
that simplifies greatly the design of on-line systems. 
Consequently, it isn't that the communications aspects of these 
systems make them more complicated, but rather that their 
3 ~ n e  of the deficiencies in Sterling's argument is that he 
never defines what he means by 'centralized.' King [King 831 
provides an excellent discussion of the centralization issue and 
information systems. He identifies three general categories of 
centralization: Centralization of control, concerned with the 
location of decision making activity; centralization of physical 
location; and centralization of function, referring to the 
position of an activity within the structure of an organization. 
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asynchronous nature requires more complicated internal control 
schemes. Sterling continues to confuse on-line with 
decentralized and his statements, in this regard, are inaccurate. 
In any event, it is hard to see why the "hierarchical structure 
of large organizations will be reinforced" by these systems and 
how computing "promotes centralization." 
If anything, the current trend, referred to as end user 
computing [Rockart 831, driven by the influx of micro-computers 
and information centers, is toward decentralization of 
information systems. While this creates management problems in 
coordination and control, it does provide many people in 
organizations with more access to data and computation facilities 
than they had previously. 
Space does not permit a discussion of Sterling's other 
themes. In general, the conclusions are the same: His positions 
are not supported by either his arguments, or the evidence. 
Organizational Processes 
With regard to the second question, whether the reasons 
provided by Sterling are plausible, part of difficulty appears to 
be the way Sterling has chosen to depict large organizations. He 
evidently perceives them as being directed by a single omnipotent 
individual, with a consistent goal, who effortlessly shapes the 
remainder of the staff to his desires: 
As management has the ultimate authority, those 
computerized packages tend to be selected or specified 
which suit management best. (p. 15) 
and again: 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-85-87 
In the end, computing will reinforce the power and 
influence of those individuals and groups who control 
resources and power in an organization. (p. 15) 
What a conveniently simple conception of organizations! Outcomes 
occur because leaders desire them. Somehow, this fails to 
capture the richness of Allison's [Allison 711 models of 
bureaucratic machinations, either organizational process or 
political, where many crucial decisions follow from 
organizational routines rather than from central choice. In his 
analysis, Allison found that principal actors differed markedly 
in their perceptions of problems, their estimates of the 
consequences of different courses of action, and in their 
preferred solutions. How can we then accept Sterling's position 
that choices about computerized packages are made solely by the 
individual at the top? Moreover, there is no reason to believe 
that all of the people at the top, in many different types of 
large organizations, would be of the same mind in this matter. 
Consequently, one must dismiss Sterling's explanation of why 
these outcomes occur as being simplistic. His notions are not 
supported by research findings; they are speculation. He has not 
considered any of the factors from the implementation literature. 
His explanations rule out much of the work in organizational 
psychology and sociology, management science, public 
administration and other fairly well developed fields that 
produce whatever small insights into human and organizational 
behavior have been made. Even though Sterling bungled the job, 
the central issue remains: Is Technology likely to transform 
radically our business and social institutions? 
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The Trajectory of Technology 
In a recent article that provides a complete and balanced 
review of the impact of computer technology on organizations, 
Attewell and Rule [Attewell 841  observe that these questions are 
not new, they have been issues of social and economic thought 
since the nineteenth century. They go on to point out that many 
writers consider the effects of computer technology as foregone 
conclusions, "as though they could be determined, a priori." 
They maintain that the results of studies are mixed and 
inconclusive and that "a priori arguments are particularly 
inappropriate in light of the range and variety of" factors at 
work in these situations. 
Given the range of factors suggested by the implementation 
literature, it seems unlikely that the concerns raised by 
Sterling are likely to occur. We can not say, a priori, that 
computer systems will encourage "anti-democratic" developments, 
promote "centralization," limit "participation," or increase 
"monitoring" of citizens. Then, are there any dangers? I 
believe so. But, these are relative rather than absolute 
concerns. One is that in deciding to implement computer systems, 
rationales for efficiency may be used to mask political motives. 
The technology may be used as a vehicle , in certain situations, 
to achieve self-serving, or even illegal ends. These must be 
recognized and opposed. If a manager doesn't understand, or is 
unwilling to understand what a system does, the system shouldn't 
be built. Culpability should not be confounded by the presence 
of technology. In many respects the risks have become greater 
because of technology's ability to obscure motives and 
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consequences. 
Another danger is that in re-allocating tasks between people 
and machines the resulting jobs may become poorer, for example, 
more specialized, less variety, shorter cycle-times, or machine 
paced [Turner 84al. The reasons why this can occur are 
complicated, having to do more with the values of system 
implementors than with the technology itself [Turner 84b]. Labor 
is a critical resource that must not be depleted, which suggests 
that greater emphasis be placed on working life quality, 
Associated with this issue is concern for workers who may 
become displaced by technology. It would be unwise, as a policy 
matter, to prohibit replacement of tasks performed by people (by 
those performed by machine), since this process is the primary 
source of improvements in productivity. There is a need, 
however, to provide alternate job opportunities and training for 
workers who may become dislocated. If this were not to occur, 
and there turns out to be considerable displacement, then it 
could lead to Sterling's "pool of impoverished unemployables." 
Another danger is inflated expectations. Fueled by over- 
energetic salesmen, people may come to believe that technology 
will solve social, political, economic and even managerial 
problems. When benefits are not forthcoming, disillusionment may 
result precluding more appropriate use of the technology. 
Particularly troublesome are the hidden costs of computing, 
factors often overlooked in implementation that disrupt work 
settings and produce unanticipated consequences. 
Are the changes likely to be radical? Probably not. 
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Organizations have too much inertia and people have too many 
habits. If we have learned anything from the studies 
technological innovation it is that the process determines the 
outcome. Outcomes are not predetermined, they are the result of 
a complex interaction of many factors during implementation. The 
process of applying the technology may produce more lasting 
changes than the technology itself, 
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